Desert Insurgency is a well-written and lavishly illustrated volume that describes the surveys and excavations of the Great Arab Revolt Project (2006–2014; GARP), directed by Neil Faulkner and Nicholas J. Saunders. At the end of this project, the directors decided to publish separate volumes that would complement one another (Faulkner 2016: xv; Saunders 2020: 2). Faulkner published a study of the First World War in the Middle East, while Saunders wrote a synthesis of GARP's archaeological fieldwork in southern Jordan (Faulkner 2016: xiv).The “Introduction” (Ch. 1) and “Into the Ghost-Land” (Ch. 2) provide background information on this project. GARP began as an archaeological investigation into the construction and operation of the Hejaz railroad and its associated infrastructure, such as bridges, construction camps, and stations. The survey universe extended from the Ma'an station in the north to the Mudawwara station in the south, a distance of 113 km (1). In the first season, an Ottoman army camp was encountered in Wadi Rutm, and this discovery changed the scope of this project. Faulkner and Saunders now concentrated their efforts on the survey and excavation of Ottoman fortifications that were built to protect the Hejaz railroad from Allied raids during the First World War. The Great Arab Revolt Project was an interdisciplinary study in conflict archaeology that used archaeological data to investigate guerrilla warfare (1–2). GARP was run as an archaeological field school and the fees funded the fieldwork (3). This project typically fielded 30 people, including staff and volunteers (3). Their fieldwork was timely, as several sites had been damaged by modern construction activities (6, 113, 121). These sites are not protected by Jordanian Antiquities Law No. 21, which only protects archaeological sites that predate 1750 CE (270 n. 10).In “Archaeology, Material Worlds, and the Arab Revolt” (Ch. 3), Saunders addresses several themes. His definition of modern conflict archaeology is lengthy and obtuse (13). A significant portion of this chapter describes the social history of select items that were associated with Lawrence and the Arab Revolt. “The Hejaz Railway: Faith, Conflict, and Afterlife” (Ch. 4) provides an interesting overview of the Hejaz railroad from its inception in 1900 to its demise in 1925 (246). Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II used various stratagems to fund this project. Artifacts were removed from shipwrecks and sold. Obsolete artillery pieces in the fortresses at Acco, Jaffa, and Tripoli were put up for auction (36). Taxes were levied on various citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Funds were even solicited from the Muslim inhabitants of British-occupied Egypt and India (37–39). Following the First World War, damaged portions of the track were reused as building materials for houses and fences (51, 52, fig. 4.11). This portion of the text is complemented by color photographs of select buildings and architectural features associated with the Hejaz railway (42, 43, 46, 47, 56).“Guerrillas and the ‘Sultan's Mule’” (Ch. 5) contextualizes Lawrence's military activities against the Hejaz railway without devolving into hagiography. The concept of raiding the Hejaz railway was originally proposed by Aziz al-Masri, who was once Prince Faisal's chief of staff (61). Initial attacks were led by Major Herbert Garland and Lt. Col. Stewart Newcombe. Their success led Lawrence to attack the Aba el Naam Station (62). Arab and/or European officers led raiding parties comprised of Arab soldiers and/or Bedouin tribesmen. On several occasions these forces were augmented with air support, armored cars, and artillery (62, 67–68, 72, 74, 81). Sometimes raids were undermined by intertribal disputes (76). Lawrence's liberal distribution of British gold was often the glue that held these raiding parties together (65–66, 80, 85).GARP's surveys and excavations are summarized in Chapters 6–10. Each chapter describes the archaeological fieldwork along a specific segment of the railway. For example, “Conflict on Jebel Sherra” (Ch. 6) spans an area extending from Ma'an Station in the north to Site 1066 in the south, a distance of 44 km (116). Within each chapter, the sites are organized in a north–south direction and not by chronological period. The archaeological record is divided into three periods: the construction of the Hejaz railway from Ma'an to Mudawwara (1904–1906), the First World War (1917–1918), and those remains that postdate this conflict (245–46). Most archaeological sites are from the First World War. “Conflict on Jebel Sherra” (Ch. 6) principally describes the archaeological evidence for the battle of Ma'an, which occurred on April 17, 1918. “‘Belly of the Beast’” (Ch. 7) summarizes those First World War fortifications that extended from Bir Shedia Station to Batn al-Ghoul. “Forts, Stations, and Ancestors” (Ch. 8) contains a detailed discussion of the militarized landscapes in Wadi Rutm and Tel Shahm. “Concealment, Raiding, and Ambush” (Ch. 9) contains important information on a number of sites situated between Tooth Hill and Hallat Ammer. Tooth Hill East and West functioned as bases for British raids and the latter is directly associated with T. E. Lawrence (192). For Saunders, these campsites represent the “grail of modern conflict archaeology, as they preserved the faintest traces of military activity in a vast and hostile desert” (192). This account is followed by a description of three impressive Ottoman-built redoubts that were intended to protect Mudawwara Station from British attack. Finally, there is an overview of the archaeological evidence for T. E. Lawrence's ambush of an Ottoman train at Hallat Ammar.The concluding chapter, “Beyond the Railway” (Ch. 10), touches on several subjects that are not associated with the Hejaz railway. For instance, Saunders summarizes the archaeological remains of military camps and fortifications at Wuheida, which is 16 km to the west of Ma'an (219–28). There is also a brief discussion of the British advanced landing ground at Disi near Wadi Rum. Saunders ends the volume with the following conclusions: many sites were very well preserved because of their remote locations; GARP provided an archaeological perspective on asymmetrical warfare (239); GARP's integration of archaeological data with historical sources provided a nuanced perspective on the First World War in southern Jordan.There are many positive aspects to this volume. Saunders is at his best when describing the archaeological remains associated with the Hejaz railroad and the Ottoman fortifications that protected it. He skillfully weaves archaeological and historical data to shed light on the ambush at Hallat Ammar and the battle of Ma'an. The subject matter is illustrated with copious color photographs, and the ground plans of forts, stations, and trenches are very good (180, figs. 8.25, 8.26, 211, fig. 9.19). The notes for Chapters 6–10 often provide lists of the artifacts retrieved from specific sites (309 n. 129, 315 n. 81, 321 n. 33). Saunders's greatest contribution is in highlighting the massive investment made by the Ottoman military in fortifying the Hejaz railroad. The militarized landscapes in Wadi Rutm and Tel Shahm are impressive. In this respect Saunders has provided a major service by highlighting this area for future archaeological research. GARP's results clearly demonstrate the need to record and protect these remains.Desert Insurgency's strengths are diminished by numerous issues that can be grouped into five categories. First, there are historical errors and inaccuracies. For example, Saunders suggests that it was not until the First World War that non-Muslim Europeans could visit Arabia (12): “One of these was Arabia, where the First World War opened the doors to a land previously unknown to non-Muslims.” This statement is untenable given the numerous nineteenth-century travelogues that were written by those Europeans who visited Arabia (Eickelman 2002: 29–43; Van der Steen 2013: 32–33).Another instance is the caption and credit accompanying figure 5.8, which are incomplete, if not inaccurate. This caption reads “Turkish soldiers in their trenches,” and it is cited as being in the public domain. Actually, this photograph was snapped by members of the American Colony Photograph Department and it depicts Ottoman soldiers in the “Trenches at Hareira,” which is the archaeological site of Tell Abu Hareira/Tell Haror, in the western Negev, Israel (Larsson, American Colony Photo Department, and Pasha 1914–1917, image 24).Second, Saunders's rancor toward granting agencies detracts from the text and inadvertently highlights a methodological flaw with this book. The directors did not apply for grants because they knew that their proposals would be rejected (3). Saunders spins this as a positive development that actually provided them with more flexibility in the field (4). Perhaps this is true, albeit Saunders never explicitly describes the survey and excavation methods employed by GARP. Metal detectors were “systematically” used in the field; however, there is no discussion of the methodology behind their use (4, 128, 147). One wonders if the excavations were carried out based solely on the results of metal detecting. On a related note, GARP's anthropological framework is idiosyncratic and ill-defined. They were in the field during the Iraq War (2003–2011) and this coincidence is thought to have had methodological import (3): “There was little doubt that doing conflict archaeology in a region still dominated by war was an anthropological endeavour.” How?Third, there are problems with the presentation of the archaeological data. Abbreviations such as “AR” and “FR,” followed by a date, are referenced in the notes, but they are not defined (see page 304 nn. 53, 56, 57; 320 nn. 9–14, 25). Some sites are identified by multiple names, such as Site 1126, which is also known as Siddons Ridge Camp or SRC11 (260). Archaeological data is scattered unevenly throughout Chapters 6–10. The heights of some walls are mentioned in the text; however, the dimensions of their doorways are in the notes (136, 305 nn. 69–70). The headstamp codes on rifle cartridges are mentioned in some notes, while in others they are not (306 n. 85; 316 n. 90). The sites listed in the archaeological gazetteer are lacking grid coordinates. This information is housed on the Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa website (EAMENA) (249). This is a problem. In Desert Insurgency Tooth Hill Camps East and West are described as being approximately 2.5–4 km to the east of Tel Shahm Fort (189–90), yet in the EAMENA database the “Tooth Hill Camp” is located to the west of Tel Shahm Fort (Fig. 1).Fourth, there are issues with the interpretation of the archaeological record. Some of Saunders's interpretations are driven by Lawrence's narrative. For instance, there is an archaeological site within one kilometer of the British encampment at Tooth Hill Camp West and Saunders suggests that they are contemporary (191–92): “Almost a kilometre further west were two areas of large irregular stones on an otherwise smooth sandy surface, and which might have been the Bedouin campsite. This physical separation may have been due to the antipathy between the Bedouin and the Egyptians, and which Lawrence refers to by noting that the Arabs were ‘put in a tactical place behind a hill, where they were in support but out of sight and hearing of the line.’” The problem here is that this undated campsite is bereft of any archaeological evidence that links it with the Arab Revolt.At times, Saunders seemingly contradicts himself when he discusses Bedouin archaeological remains. On 7 November 2007, a few Bedouin overnighted at a location on the Batn al-Ghoul plateau. On the following day, Saunders visited the remains of this encampment and reached the following conclusion (165–66): “These most ephemeral of markers would have been obscured by a strong wind within twenty-four hours, and the only clue would have been any metal items left behind or lost. This was the archaeology of yesterday, demonstrating the transient nature of desert nomadism, the fragility of horizontal stratigraphy, and the elusiveness of temporary Bedouin sites today as well as during Arab Revolt [sic].” Granted, an overnight encampment may not be preserved in the archaeological record. Nonetheless, Saunders's comment is at odds with ethnoarchaeological studies of Bedouin encampments that he later cites in a note (336 n. 101). Those studies demonstrate that contemporary Bedouin tent camps do have an archaeological signature.Fifth, Bedouin warfare is reduced to a stereotype. There are many trite remarks about Bedouin fighting, tactics, and “guerrilla cunning”; despite that, there is no substantive discussion of this subject (44, 45, 184). Alois Musil (1928) and William Lancaster (1997) wrote on this matter and Saunders should have consulted their publications. His premise that the Bedouins' acquisition of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century firearms resulted in an uptick in tribal attacks on the Hejaz caravans (59) is problematic: Lancaster's ethnographic research suggests otherwise. Lancaster noted that muzzle-loading weapons were not useful for Bedouin raiders because of the time required to reload them (Lancaster 1997: 141–42). Prior to the introduction of late nineteenth-century rifles, the Bedouin typically engaged in close-quarter combat with handheld weapons (Lancaster 1997: 142–43). The acquisition of late nineteenth-century repeater and bolt-action rifles changed the nature of Bedouin warfare and feuding. Hence, Saunders's comments on “traditional Bedouin tactics” need to be tempered with this knowledge (233).After the project, Saunders sought to establish a museum exhibit on the archaeology of the Hejaz railroad and Arab Revolt (239–40). Initially, museums were not interested. Saunders was also unable to muster any interest in the entertainment industry for a documentary about the Great Arab Revolt Project. Ultimately, the Newark Museum (UK) commissioned Saunders to design an exhibition about GARP. However, it was entitled “Shifting Sands: Lawrence of Arabia—Celebrity, Anonymity, Legacy” (240 fig. 10.15). The emphasis on Lawrence made this exhibition a resounding success. This episode is a metaphor for Desert Insurgency. The prominence placed on Lawrence and his associates is contrived and colonial as it diminishes the significance of the Ottoman archaeological remains described in Chapters 6–10. Saunders has two unique and very important sets of data: the campsites of railway workers and the encampments and fortifications of Ottoman soldiers. This would have been an opportunity to describe the life and conditions of those Ottoman workers and soldiers stationed in southern Jordan. Such description would have been a major contribution and one that would have demonstrated why these archaeological sites should be excavated and protected—a point mentioned in the beginning of the book but not reiterated in the conclusion. On a larger level, this would have been an opportunity to interest Jordanian and Turkish archaeologists in the subject matter at hand.Popular audiences and Lawrence aficionados will most likely dismiss or overlook the issues described above. For them, this book will no doubt be an enjoyable read with excellent color photographs and good ground plans. On the face of it, Desert Insurgency seems to double as a popular book and an archaeological monograph. The latter it is not. Until a proper archaeological monograph is published, archaeologists will have to be content with data-mining Desert Insurgency.